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MEDICARE/MEDICAID

Medicare Reasonable
And Medically
Necessary Care:
Skirmishes at the Front
Medicare covers costs for

By Journal Staff

health care deemed
"reasonableand
necessary" and excludes
care classified as
"experimental,
investigative, or
unproven." However,
every rule has its
exceptions. This article
discusses coverage limits
and the exceptions for
which Medicare will
authorizepayment.

edicare covers
health care
costs for reasonable and

necessary
health care.' In contrast, coverage
excludes any care that is experimental, investigative, or unproven.2 Coverage is also limited
by the rules determining the scope
of health care. For example, Medicare does not cover dental services
or cosmetic surgery. These two
examples are central to the controversies about coverage that
mark the limits to Medicare and
the numerous exceptions that authorize Medicare payment.

Experimental, Investigative,
Or Unproven
These exclusions might apply to
hospital care, such as high-tech

detection or treatments undertaken in the hospital, which would
implicate Part A coverage (hospital insurance, or HI); or Part B
(supplemental medical insurance,
or SMI) because of physician's fees
or costs of medical devices.
Explanation of the first descriptor, "experimental" is quite
limited. Regulations and other
publications define experimental
only with regard to medical devices. Medicare will not pay for
any device considered experimental. Neither will the program pay
for services provided in conjunction with the experimental device,
nor for services needed for re3
covery from such treatment.
However, the Medicare Carriers
Manual allows payment for treatment of complications arising
4
from the use of such devices.
In 2000, however, the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA), renamed in 2001
the Center for Medicare and
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Medicaid Services (CMS), published a change of policy that
authorizes payment for many services provided in certain clinical
trials conducted by government
agencies including the National
Institutes of Health, and under the
auspices of the National Cancer
Institute.5 This authorization may
include new drugs or drug applications. Other trials might qualify
if the researcher has furnished
CMS the required information.
The scope of coverage remains
limited, in that the investigational
item or service is not covered.
Other noncovered items include
tests conducted solely to determine statistical information for
the purposes of the study, and anything furnished without charge by
the researchers. Otherwise, Medicare covers all the health care
items and services provided to
such patients.
With regard to investigational
medical devices, CMS generally
follows the approval process of
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). However, the agency
also authorizes payment for devices not approved by the FDA
that it considers them to be "nonexperimental, investigational"
devices, provided they are used in
clinical trials approved by the
FDA.
A case illustrates the progress
of a familiar technology from
"experimental, investigative, and
unproven" to "reasonable and
necessary." In Goodman v.
Sullivan,6 the patient underwent
an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) procedure on February 8,
1985, to determine the cause of a
speech impediment. He was aware
at the time that the MRI was not
approved for payment under
Medicare for this purpose because

it was considered to be experimental and unproven. In November
of the same year, the Secretary
of HHS approved coverage of
the MRI procedure. Goodman
brought a claim for recovery of
$675 for his MRI.
Goodman argued that the
Medicare program is required by
law to cover all care that a physician determines to be medically
necessary, citing statutory language
that is phrased in the negative:
Medicare need not cover items and
services "not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or
treatment of illness or injury."'
Goodman relied on a Medicaid case
Rush v. Parham',construing medical necessity in procedures relating
to a sex-change operation. The
court distinguished the two programs, and found that in any case,
a regulation "may adopt a definition of medical necessity that places
reasonable limits on a physician's
discretion ... [such as] a ban against
reimbursement for experimental
forms of treatment..."
The court considered the impact of such a denial on health care
and medical practice, in response
to Goodman's argument that the
decision conflicted with federal law:
"Nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed to authorize any Federal office or employee to exercise
any supervision or control over the
practice of medicine or the manner
in which medical services are provided... "0 The court first ob-

served that the statute did not control the practice of medicine; rather,
it limited Medicare reimbursement.
The purpose of the limitation, according to the court, was not to
stifle technological change, to favor
one procedure over another, or to
influence the judgment of medical
professionals."

The court observed that the
date of the Secretary's approval,
seven months after Goodman's
MRI, was reasonable given the
mandate to execute faithfully the
mandates of the Medicare statute.
It observed that the Secretary
"necessarily must paint with a
broad brush" in distinguishing
reasonable and necessary from
experimental. Thus, the Secretary
had carried out her responsibilities and, implicitly, the date upon
which HHS approved the payment is the date after which MRI
procedures for Medicare beneficiaries are covered.
An analogous circumstance,
with a twist, arose in Yale-New

Haven Hospitalv. Thompson,1 2 in
-which the hospital sought reimbursement for $1,500,000 in
services the Secretary had denied
pursuant to a superceded guideline. The hospital had provided
surgical implantation of experimental medical devices provided
by the hospital to Medicare beneficiaries. The hospital also sought
invalidation of the guideline. The
court refused to dismiss on the
Secretary's motion claiming collateral estoppel on procedural
grounds, and remanded to hear
arguments on the merits of the
hospital's claims.
When a guideline is valid and
applicable, it is most likely to determine the outcome, though the
distinction between covered and
noncovered services is slight. In

Matthews v. Shalala," the plaintiff-patient sought review of denial
of her claim for coverage of home
oxygen therapy. Her doctor had
prescribed home oxygen therapy
to alleviate her medical condition,
known as multiple chemical sensitivity syndrome. The Medicare
insurance carrier terminated the
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benefit pursuant to a national coverage decision made pursuant to
a federal rulemaking procedure.
The court found that the drafters
of the national coverage determination intended to reimburse
oxygen therapy costs only for
those persons suffering from hypoxemia, and that the rulemaking
was not promulgated in an arbitrary manner. Thus, coverage was
effectively limited though the
plaintiff's condition had not been
specifically considered, and her
motion for remand to the commissioner to supplement the
rulemaking was denied.

Services Not Normally
Covered and Exceptions
Certain classes of care, such as
dental care, lie outside the scope
of Medicare coverage. 14 However,
some such services might be covered if they are necessary in order
to provide safe and effective care
that is covered by Medicare.

In Wood v. Shalala,s the patient-plaintiff required heart valve
replacement. His infected teeth
presented a threat to health if
the surgery proceeded without
removal and cure of the condition. Wood had fourteen of his
teeth removed by his dentist in
an office procedure. Shortly thereafter, Wood underwent heart
valve replacement surgery. His
surgeon stated that he would not
have done the valve surgery if the
teeth had not been removed, because of the risk of infection. The
bill for the tooth extractions was
$1,156. The Secretary denied coverage and the District Court
affirmed.
The court of appeals decision
is a catalog of exceptions, both
general and specific, that relate to
such ancillary services and can

trigger Medicare coverage despite
the general prohibition on dental
coverage. The court agrees with
plaintiff Woods that the interpretation of the Medicare statute is
ambiguous because the Secretary
gives no reasons for the exceptions. There it considers the list
in order to determine whether the
Secretary's interpretation is reasonable, in light of the plaintiffs
arguments that the interpretation
in his case is inconsistent with
prior interpretation; and that the
rationale behind prior exceptions,
to decrease the chance of infection
and increase the chance of successful surgery, applies here.
The first exception plaintiff
put forward is the "same physician rule" that authorizes payment for services by an oral surgeon during the course of a
covered surgery, though the specific services would not normally
be covered.16 Clearly, Wood did
not have his extractions done by
the same surgeon. Under a factual
variation on the "same physician
rule" identified by the Court of
Appeals, the patient might receive
services performed by a dentist "at
the same time as the surgical removal of a tumor" and "the
totality of the surgery would be a
covered service. The court finds,
in agreement with the administrative law judge (ALJ), that the
exception does not apply in
Wood's case, in which two physicians, a dentist and a surgeon, did
separate procedures at separate
times in separate locations.
Two corollaries to the "same
physician" rule take into account
work by another physician in association with some covered
physician service. One is dental
care in preparation for radiation
of the jaw.17 Another is inpatient

dental examination conducted in
preparation for kidney transplant
surgery.'" The ALJ held that neither exception applied to the facts
of the case, both being specific to
an identified procedure and, for
the second, also limiting the service to examination only. The
Court of Appeals concurred, noting that ESRD is a special case
among all Medicare services.
Wood also argued that Part B
pays for "otherwise covered services" furnished by a doctor of
dental surgery or dental medicine
if those services would be covered
as physician services when provided by a doctor of medicine."
The court notes the Secretary's
argument that interpreting the
"otherwise covered" provision as
Wood suggests might allow coverage of many dental services that
might be covered if provided by a
medical doctor. Also, the court
notes that the provision expressly
states that the exclusion of dental
services remains in effect. Without endorsing all the Secretary's
arguments as effective, the court
nevertheless concludes that the
"otherwise covered" provision
does not extend to Wood's dental
extractions.
The specific exceptions argued
by attorneys of the Wisconsin
Coalition on Aging become increasingly interesting in their
number and variety. A federal program of Rural Health Clinics and
Federally Qualified Health Centers defines an exception for
dental services in its manual: "A
dental examination for patients
requiring certain complex surgical procedures may be covered.
To date, the only identified procedures for which dental examinations are covered are kidney
transplants and heart valve
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replacements." The court notes
that Wood was not a patient of
the programs covered by the
manual. The specific reference to
heart valve replacement prompts
the court's comment:
...the reference to heart valve
replacements indicates their specific inclusion within the general
exception to the exclusion for examinations in connection with
surgical procedures. While this
reference lends some weight to
Wood's argument, it appears in
an isolated corner of the administrative provisions and is not
strong enough to prevail over the
authority to the contrary.20

Further, notes the court, only examination, not treatment, is
authorized.
A Wisconsin program initiated in 1996 also would have
brought Wood's dental extractions under Medicare, since the
program specifically provides
"Medicare coverage of dental extractions due to infections prior
to heart valve replacement surgeries." The court observes that
Wood received care in Michigan,
not Wisconsin, and that, in any
case, he had the procedure before
the implementation of the Wisconsin coverage.21
Wood argues a Social Security
decision that seems to support his
claim, in which the patient had to
have all his infected teeth removed
prior to implantation of a
defibrillator. The court quotes the
ALJ's holding that the extractions
were covered by Medicare because of "an exception to the
dental services exclusion in the
regulations because the dental
work was required secondary to
a severe heart condition."22

Advisor

|

Wood argues the legislative
history of the Medicare provisions, citing the committee bill
that makes a specific exclusion of
dental services. Wood notes, however, that the committee intended
that only "complex surgical procedures" should be covered. The
court rejects the idea that Wood's
extractions, at least in themselves,
amount to a complex surgical
procedure. Wood has finally exhausted his quiver of arguments
and his claim is denied because
Medicare does not cover dental
services.
The road to coverage for a
service typically excluded from
Medicare coverage seems to be
paved with quite specific language. However, not all cases are
as resistant as Wood's. In Stein v.
Secretary of HHS,23 the patient
was denied coverage for her inpatient hospital rehabilitation
program because it was not reasonable and necessary. The
applicable rule 85-2 states that a
patient in need of inpatient hospital rehabilitation requires all of
the following:
1. close medical supervision
by a physician with specialized training or experience in rehabilitation;
2. twenty-four-hour rehabilitation nursing;
3. a relatively intense level of
physical therapy or occupational therapy and, if
needed, speech therapy,
social services, psychological services, or prosthetic-orthotic services;
4. a multi-disciplinary team
approach to the delivery
of the program;
5. a coordinated program of
care;
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6. significant practical improvement;
7. realistic goals; and
8. a properly terminating
program.
On appeal, the district court
reversed the agency determination, holding that the rule was
a factor to be considered if the
attending physician and the Utilization Review Committee were
not in agreement. In Mrs. Stein's
case, the physician and utilization
review committee agreed on the
appropriateness of in-patient care.
Finally, the court vacated and remanded the decision to the district
court because it had not applied
the rule to the facts of the case,
providing the court of appeals an
inadequate basis for review.
On the other hand, in
Chipman v. Shalala 24 the patient
had jaw bone augmentation surgery, which later permitted the
placement of porcelain veneer
crowns. The claimant submitted
Medicare claims for payment of
both the surgery and the crowns.
The ALJ concluded that payment
for the bone augmentation surgery was covered by Medicare but
that the porcelain veneer crowns
were not. Chipman filed a complaint in federal district court,
which affirmed the agency's decision. On appeal, the federal
district court affirmed, holding
that there was no evidence that the
crowns were medically necessary.

Endnotes
1.

42 U.S.C. S 1395y(a). The
phrase often used is "reason-

able and medically necessary".
2. 42 U.S.C. S 1395hh(a) (autho-

rizing the Secretary of Health
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and Human Services to interpret Medicare limitations.); see
also Medicare Part B Carrier
Manual, Coverage Issues
Appendix and Medicare Part B
Intermediary Letter No. 77-7
cited in Goodman v. Sullivan,
infra n. 6 at 451.
3.

42 C.F.R. 5 405.207.

4.

Carriers Manual Pt.3 Sec 2300
(for Part B); Intermediary
Manual Pt. 3 Sec 3103.14.C.
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8.

625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980).

9. Id. at 1154-55.
10. 42 U.S.C. 5 1395.
11. Such rhetoric might be less
persuasive today, when reduced
fee for service and prospective
payment are, at least in part,
intended to influence the
physician recommendations
and patient choices.
12. 162 F. Supp. 2d 54 (2001).

5.

6.
7.

Coverage Issues Manual Sec.
30-1. The original rules with
regard to clinical trials of
medical devices, which apply to
all that do not qualify under
the exception, are found at 42
C.F.R. 55 405.201 - 405.215,
411.15(o).
891 F.2d 449 (2nd Cir. 1990).
Note that this phrase represents
the justification for Medicare's
failure to provide any preventive services unless specifically
authorized by law.

13. No. 93 Civ. 1404, 1993 U.S.
Dist. WESTLAw 385783
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
14. Other classes of services not
normally covered include
routine physical checkups and
examinations for insurance and
employment, eye exams and
glasses, hearing aids, immunizations (except for certain
authorized services for pneumonia, influenza and
sometimes hepatitis B), orthopedic shoes (except for some

shoes for persons with diabetes), cosmetic surgery (except in
cases of accidental injury or in
order to improve the function
of the affected body member),
and routine foot care.
15. 246 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 2001).
16. Medicare Carrier's Manual
5 2136.
17. Id. at 1029.
18. A third exception, a covered
medical procedure performed
by the same physician doing the
dental work, is noted by the
court, but seems entirely
inapplicable to the facts.
19. Id. at 1032.
20. Id. at 1033.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1034.
23. 924 F.2d 431 (2nd Cir. 1991).
24. 90 F.3d 421 (10th Cir. 1996).

